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Abstract. This article aims to understand how national unity is being constructed in 
the context of the protest movement, started on October 17, 2019 in Lebanon, what it 
is grounded on and what is the role of the elite in the process. The study is based on an 
ethnographic study conducted in Beirut between October 17 and December 19, 2019 and 
analyzes the movement of October 17th as an instance of nation-building from below.
It became clear that a unity across different communities has emerged from below and 
reached a “tipping point” coinciding with the movement of October 17th, which provided 
new spaces for people to engage in “viral peer-to-peer networking,” creating a “feedback 
loop” reinforcing unity based on shared grievances and the idea of a civil state. It is argued 
that the elite are not necessary for a national sentiment to emerge. Its durability is though 
assumed to be related to efficacy and thus possibly impacted by leadership. 
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„Su Libano vėliava“: nacionalinės vienybės samprata  
Spalio 17-osios judėjime
Santrauka. Šis straipsnis siekia išsiaiškinti, kaip 2019 m. spalio 17 d. Libane prasidė-
jusiame protesto judėjime buvo kuriama nacionalinė vienybė, kuo ji grindžiama ir koks 
elito vaidmuo šiame procese. Straipsnis, paremtas etnografiniu tyrimu, atliktu Beirute tarp 
2019 m. spalio 17 d. ir gruodžio 19 d., analizuoja Libano spalio 17-osios judėjimą iš tautos 
kūrimo iš apačios perspektyvos.
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Išaiškėjo, kad skirtingų bendruomenių vienybė atsirado iš apačios ir pasiekė lūžio 
tašką, sutampantį su Spalio 17-osios judėjimu, kuris atvėrė naujas erdves žmonėms kurti 
tinklus, skleisti ir taip stiprinti vienybės idėją, pagrįstą bendromis negandomis ir pilietinės 
valstybės vizija. Daroma išvada, kad elitas nebūtinas nacionalinei vienybei atsirasti, tačiau 
jos išlaikymas siejamas su efektyvumu, kuriam įtakos gali turėti lyderystės problema.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: Libanas, nacionalizmas, socialiniai judėjimai, sektarianizmas, 
konfesionalizmas.
Introduction
On October 17, 2019, a nationwide protest movement started in 
Lebanon. It began with a group of activists taking to the streets of 
Beirut, but the wave quickly spread across the country. The tension 
had been growing for a while due to a worsening economic crisis, the 
government’s plans to increase certain taxes and the shortage of dol-
lars in circulation. In addition to that, extensive wildfires broke out 
on October 15, which in 48 hours destroyed double as much forest as 
is lost on an average year. Lebanon received aid from abroad, while 
the local government proved unequipped to solve the issue. The three 
firefighting helicopters previously donated to the country were never 
employed because no funding was allocated for their maintenance. 
All of this, along with long-lasting problems of inequality, corrup-
tion, electricity outages and other issues, infuriated the population. 
The final drop was the government’s decision to tax Voice Over In-
ternet Protocol calls, which are calls made via applications such as 
Whatsapp and Messenger, taken on October 17. Whatsapp being the 
most popular platform for VoIP in Lebanon, some labeled the move-
ment a “Whatsapp revolution,” which was widely criticized as the 
protests were concerned with much broader issues. Indeed, the VoIP 
tax was canceled the same night, but it did not stop the movement. 
Likewise, the protests went on after the prime minister at the time, 
Saad Hariri, presented a reform plan and after his resignation on Oc-
tober 29. The protesters did not trust the ability of the system in place 
to resolve their grievances. They demanded a change of the regime, 
an independent government to arrange new elections and reform the 
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sectarian system.1 One of the distinguishing traits of the movement, 
at least at its beginning, was the broad participation across differ-
ent social classes, sects and regions, and lack of coordination by any 
political party or other organizations.
From the regional perspective the protest movement in question 
can first of all be related to the Arab Spring, as illustrated by one of 
its slogans borrowed from the latter: “The people want to bring down 
the regime” (Ash-shaʻb yurīd isqāṭ an-niẓām). The events share many 
similarities when it comes to their reasons and goals. They can also 
be attributed a certain transformational role. Mojtaba Mahdavi argues 
that the Arab Spring brought about a new discourse “introduced by 
ordinary people” in the form of post-Islamism.2 Dalia Fahmy and Eid 
Mohamed suggest that the Arab Spring was “excavating new meta-
phors” transcending nationalism seen as colonial legacy.3 The idea of 
a new discourse brought about by “ordinary people” is seen as highly 
relevant for the movement analyzed here as well. The discussion on 
Islam, however, cannot be directly translated to the Lebanese case 
due to its religious demographics. Meanwhile, the new discourse is 
seen as actually building on national sentiment rather than moving 
away from it.  
There had been other movements mobilizing people across dif-
ferent sections of Lebanese society. One such movement was the Ce-
dar Revolution of 2005 calling for the withdrawal of Syrian troops 
from Lebanon. Tamirace Fakhoury Muehlbacher asserts that despite 
1 For more details on the context of the protests and a day-by-day action map:
 Chehayeb K., Sewell A., “Why Protesters in Lebanon Are Taking to the Streets”, <https://
foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/02/lebanon-protesters-movement-streets-explainer/>, 2021-
01-29.
 Hodges E., “A Country on Fire: Lebanon’s October Revolution in Context”, <https://
www.lawfareblog.com/country-fire-lebanons-october-revolution-context>, 2021-01-29.
 Civil Sociey Knowledge Center, “Collective Action digest – Special Issue (October 
2019 – January 2020)”, <https://civilsociety-centre.org/digest/collective-action-digest-
22-october-2019>, 2021-01-29.
2 Fahmy D., Mohamed E., eds., Arab Spring: Modernity, Identity, and Change, 2020, 
Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland AG, p. 2.
3 Ibid., p. 16–17.
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the movement’s failure to entrench “a new Lebanese national ethos,” 
which seemed to have been emerging, it “left an aftertaste of a new 
collective consciousness.”4 Similarly, the wave of the Arab Spring of 
2011 reached the streets of Beirut and soon lost its momentum, leav-
ing behind what Bassel F. Salloukh calls a “symbolic challenge to 
the hegemony of the sectarian system.”5 Finally, in 2015 the biggest 
protests since 2005 erupted due to a garbage crisis. Once again, the 
movement did not bring substantial results but left something behind; 
among other things, a slogan which came back to the streets in 2019 
“Everyone means everyone” or “All of them means all of them” (Kil-
lun ya’ni killun), meaning the rejection of all the ruling class.6
All of these movements opened up a dialogue across the different 
sections of the society and brought about hope for national unity. 
Similarly, when the protests broke out in 2019, not only the economic 
grievances were in focus, but a strong narrative of unity and a pos-
sibility for reconciliation between different communities from below 
emerged. Besides, this movement gained an unprecedented scope and 
scale, especially through broad participation across the country and 
not just Beirut. It was frequently emphasized that people from all the 
sects, classes and regions stood together and that the Lebanese flag 
was the only symbol carried by the protesters.7 In November 2019, 
Salloukh argued that “The October 17 revolution marks the definitive 
end of the civil war and a genuine bottom-up reconciliation between 
one-time warring communities” and called the events “the birth of a 
4 Muehlbacher T. F., “Lebanon’s Versatile Nationalism”, EUI Working papers, Medi-
terranean Series 13, 2008, <https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/8507/
RSCAS_2008_13?sequence=1>, 2021-01-29, p. 6, 9.
5 Salloukh B. F. et al., The Politics of Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon, London: Pluto 
Press, 2015, p. 21.
6 Waterschoot J., “The 2018 campaign of the civil society Breaking through the sectar-
ian system?”, Heinrich Böll Foundation Middle East, June 2018, <https://lb.boell.org/
sites/default/files/jesse_elections.pdf>, 2021-01-29, p. 3.




Marija Rakickaja. “Under the Lebanese flag”: National Unity in the Movement of October 17th
new ‘imagined community,’ one that travels across regions, classes, 
genders, and sects.”8 A similar sentiment was shared by many. 
Thus, the objective of this paper is to grasp this sense of a newly 
emerging national unity, to explore the ways in which it was being 
constructed, and to examine its basis and the role of the elites in the 
process.
1. Nation-building: between the masses and the elite
Before proceeding any further, the nature of the events analyzed here 
needs to be addressed, as they were called a revolution by some and 
a social movement by others.9 The distinction between the two terms 
is not always crystal clear. Considered to be totally different phenom-
ena in the twentieth century, the concepts came to overlap with the 
so-called “colored revolutions” of the twenty-first century. However, 
while the contemporary strategies of revolutions and social move-
ments might be similar, the revolutions tend to be “more transform-
ative.”10 Rene Rojas and Jeff Goodwin suggest that revolution can 
broadly be defined as “any extralegal overthrow and transformation 
of a political regime or state by a popular rebellion, whether by viol-
ent or nonviolent means.”11 While the aspirations of the movement 
8 Salloukh B. F., “Reimagining an alternative Lebanon”, <https://www.executive-mag-
azine.com/lebanon-uprising/comment-lebanon-uprising/reimagining-an-alternative-
lebanon>, 2021-01-29.
9 In the media and among observers the movement has been given different names, 
such as revolution, uprising or intifada. The participants of the movement favored the 
term revolution in their slogans, conversations and social media, where various groups 
featuring the Arabic term for revolution (thawra) have been created (daleelthawra, 
thawra_voices, art_of_thawra and others). Thawra had even become a sort of a brand 
in the first months of the movement when some cafes introduced “thawra discounts” 
and alike. 
10 Goldstone J., Ritter D., “Revolution and Social Movements”, in Snow D. A., Soule S. A., 
Hanspeter K., McCammon H. J. (eds.), The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Move-
ments, Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, p. 682–697, <DOI: 10.1002/9781119168577.
ch39>.
11 Snow D. A., della Porta D., Klandermans B., McAdam D., eds., The Wiley-Blackwell 
Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements, 2013, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 
<DOI: 10.1002/9781405198431.wbespm182>, Revolutions, p. 1.
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in question were revolutionary, it is evident that the actual regime 
change has not occurred. Thus, the events analyzed here are treated 
as a social movement, understood as defined by David A. Snow: 
“collective actions through which aggrieved collectivities give voice 
publicly to various grievances and press relevant authorities to attend 
to the associated claims and/or demands.”12 As for the forms such 
movements can take, the repertoire is really broad: from spontan-
eous protests and violent uprisings to organized peaceful marches 
and demonstrations or spreading protest messages via social media 
and more.13 This allows looking at the movement as an ongoing phe-
nomenon going through different stages, as while the mass protest 
stage analyzed here might have lost its momentum, other forms of ac-
tion related to the movement of October 17th can still be encountered.
The movement of October 17th is analyzed here in terms of national 
unity emerging from below, that is, it can be seen as an instance of na-
tion-building, bringing about a certain form of nationalism. However, 
according to Thomas Hylland Eriksen, the nation comes into exist-
ence when an influential group decides upon it.14 Similarly, many ap-
proaches to nationalism accept the “Gellnerian” point of view, wherein 
it is the elites that mobilize the masses, with nationalism as a result of 
this process.15 Joseph M. Whitmeyer contests this point of view and 
provides examples of failed nationalism to show that elites are insuf-
ficient for its establishing.16 The examples are not always convincing 
due to lack of context, but the idea itself seems relevant, although it is 
not really challenging the dominant ideologies. The success of nation-
12 Ibid., Social Movements, p. 1–2.
13 Ibid., Collective action (collective behavior), p. 1.
14 Eriksen T. H., Ethnicity and Nationalism. Anthropological Perspectives, 1993, 
London: Pluto Press, p. 105.
15 Kalin M., Sambanis N., “How to Think About Social Identity”, Annual Review 
of Political Science 21, 2018, p. 239–257, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-
polisci-042016-024408>, p. 248.
16 Whitmeyer J. M., “Elites and Popular Nationalism”, The British Journal of Sociology, 
53, 2003, p. 321–341, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0007131022000000536>, 2021-04-
08, p. 321, 332.
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alism promoted by elites is not unconditional; Eriksen maintains as 
well that the success of ideology depends on the political effectiveness 
and support of the masses.17 Whitmeyer also argues that the elite does 
not construct nationalism but allows for a perhaps latent nationalist 
sentiment to express itself, and maintains that the elites “can and do 
shape its expression in a variety of ways.”18 However, while this can be 
the case, I would not agree that the elites always shape this expression, 
as demonstrated by the Lebanese case. At the same time, the argument 
that the elites cannot construct nationalism in certain cases does not 
seem entirely grounded. 
Eric Kaufmann does not reject the notion that elites play a cru-
cial role in constructing nations in some cases but emphasizes the im-
portance of horizontal or peer-to-peer national dynamics. He suggests 
looking at it through the framework of complexity theory, based on 
emergence, feedback loops, tipping points and distributed knowledge, 
or “the wisdom of crowds.” The emergency of national sentiment is 
explained in terms of everyday nationalism working through peer-to-
peer interactions, “unconscious behaviors” like “attending particular 
churches or hiring employees from one’s social network.”19 The tip-
ping point and feedback loops ensure the spread of an ideology, which 
Kaufman compares to an epidemic: “the more who become attached to 
an idea, the more vectors for its spread, until a tipping point is reached” 
in a process of “‘viral’ peer-to-peer networking.”20 Distributed know-
ledge is for Kaufman like a market economy, which is more effective 
in reaching each individual’s needs than a centralized one. Similarly, 
bottom-up nationalism is for him more accommodating to various 
personal or local nationalisms. In such way the bottom-up version of 
nationalism is seen as more effective or “viral” than a top-down one. 
Kaufman argues that “[u]nity emerges from a chaotic diversity with 
17 Eriksen, 1993, p. 105.
18 Whitmeyer, 2003, p. 321.
19 Kaufman E., “Complexity and Nationalism”, Nations and Nationalism 23 (1), 2017, 
p. 6–25, <doi: 10.1111/nana.12270>, 2021-04-08, p. 8, 12.
20 Ibid., p. 10, 16.
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the common idiom of nationhood,” while if different identity projects 
are promoted “without reference to the nation,” no unity can emerge.21 
In this point of view, referring to the nation might be strengthening the 
national sentiment in itself, regardless of different visions attached to 
this sentiment. It is interesting to consider how Kaufman’s suggestions 
apply to the Lebanese case examined here.
Before accepting the suggestion that bottom-up nationalism can 
be uniting despite being diverse, it is worth to consider what were the 
actual unifiers within the movement of October 17th and how they 
related to nationalism. The notion of civic nationalism can be useful 
for that matter. The nation is then viewed primarily as a political and 
territorial community, constructed by its citizens, wherein the highest 
form of allegiance is, as put by Anthony D. Smith, “of the citizen 
to his or her nation-state.”22 Focusing on civic nationalism doesn’t 
mean rejecting ethnic nationalism, as political or civic nationalism 
usually turns out to be ethnic and linguistic at the same time.23 The 
term “civic nationalism” is seen as relevant as it emphasizes the rela-
tionship between the state and its citizens and loyalties based on this 
relationship as opposed to other loyalties.
In terms of ethnic nationalism, ethnicity itself poses certain prob-
lems. Eriksen notes that ethnicity is dynamic and possible to manip-
ulate, and that defining it as “shared culture” is problematic, as the 
same people can share different cultural traits with different groups. 
He demonstrates how in Mauritius, for instance, Muslims, Hindus and 
Chinese are considered ethnic groups on a clearly different basis.24 
Similarly, in Lebanon the question of ethnicity is complex, for the 
sects here carry multiple meanings, including ethnic connotations (see 
p. 11–12). Thus, the dichotomy between the civic and ethnic nation-
21 Ibid., p. 19, 20.
22 Smith A. D., Nationalism and Modernism. A critical survey of recent theories of 
nations and nationalism, 1998, London: Routledge, p. 20.
23 Ibid., p. 126.
24 Eriksen T. H., Ethnicity and Nationalism. Anthropological Perspectives, 1993, 
London: Pluto Press, p. 25, 34.
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alisms could be relevant if we assign the role of ethnic nationalisms 
in Lebanon to the ideologies raising each sectarian category above all 
others. On the other hand, it is argued that the new civic nationalism is 
not detached from ethnic nationalism. The main collision might then 
lie not in the question of cultural traits, but once again, in the main 
object of loyalty for the citizens. It is in any case assumed that both 
drivers of civic and ethnic nationalisms are at play and trying to grasp 
those drivers may help to better understand the process.
An important role for the nation-building process is played by 
national symbols. Kaufman suggests that flags and proper names to 
national ideology have “a similar aggregating role to prices in a mar-
ketplace.”25 Pål Kolstø claims that national symbols, such as flags, 
anthems and alike, can work both as uniting and dividing powers de-
pending on how and by whom they are used. He also points out that, 
besides promoting and displaying the symbols in itself, an important 
“psychological mechanism” based on Pavlov’s “law of association” 
plays a role by linking positive feelings to the symbols through situ-
ations associated “with pride, joy, and high spirits.”26 It is worth to 
keep this in mind and look at how the national symbols are used and 
what they mean within the movement. 
The article examines the ways people unite within the movement 
of October 17th and aims to explore how national unity is being con-
structed through people’s interactions, what it is based on, what role 
is played by the elite and how national symbols are employed in the 
process.
2. Methodology
This paper is based on an ethnographic study consisting of parti-
cipant observation and 33 semi-structured interviews with the parti-
cipants of the demonstrations in Beirut conducted between October 
25 Kaufman, 2017, p. 20.
26 Kolstø P., “National symbols as signs of unity and division”, Ethnic and Racial Studies 
29 (4), 2006, p. 676–701, <DOI: 10.1080/01419870600665409>, p. 676, 698.
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17 and December 18, 2019. The participant observation was carried 
out primarily in Downtown Beirut, where most of the demonstrations 
were taking place, but also in other parts of the city where some ac-
tions could be observed or comments gathered. Most of the interviews 
were recorded and transcribed, except when informants refused to do 
so and the conversations were written down. One interview was con-
ducted with two informants at a time, the rest  as one-on-one conver-
sations. Certain questions were recurring throughout the interviews 
(such as the motivation for participation in the demonstrations, rela-
tion to the narrative of unity, experiences of segregation, etc.), others 
appeared in response to new developments or current discussions. 
While analyzing the data, the informants’ age, gender, religious 
affiliation, occupation, and other background information was taken 
into regard. The majority of the informants were male, which de-
pends on the higher presence of male participants on the site, es-
pecially when the scale of actions had receded (particularly during 
the working days, since approximately the beginning of November, 
although the intensity of actions varied through time). The largest age 
group among the informants is under 35 years with only one inform-
ant above 40 and two above 50 and 60, respectively. The majority 
of the informants were contacted on the site of the demonstrations 
directly and 2 of them through recommendations. More information 
is provided in the appendix.
During the research certain ethical aspects were considered. It 
was highly important to secure the informants’ anonymity, confiden-
tiality and data safety, especially keeping in mind that the informants 
could feel vulnerable because of possible reactions from their sur-
roundings, opponents of the movement, or security forces. My own 
effect on the field was also considered both while analyzing the data 
and communicating with the informants. Appearance, gender, and 
foreign origin associated with the West may have at times pushed the 
informants to modify their positions. It was therefore crucial to very 
clearly communicate my goals and positions. This was also import-
ant in order to avoid any misunderstandings and to not create false 
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expectations  for instance, by making clear that I am not a journalist 
who would be able to “make the world hear one’s story.” 
Finally, the aspect of safety and security was necessary to con-
sider. This was largely done through gathering information and 
constantly keeping track of events through social media and other 
available means. Additionally, as Stefan Malthaner suggests, it is the 
“good knowledge of the field and, in particular, good field relations 
and local support networks” that is the most important for research-
ers’ safety.27 In accordance with this, the confidence in my own safety 
was enhanced by familiarity with the physical surroundings and ties 
made with those regularly present at the sites. 
The research process was complicated by limited language skills 
(interviews were conducted in English, while only some shorter con-
versations happened in Arabic). The language barrier was partially 
tackled with some help from the locals, who assisted with transla-
tion when needed. However, this limitation could have impacted the 
scope of informants in terms of education and perhaps age. 
A few comments on the choice of the methodology should be 
made. Philip Balsiger and Alexandre Lambelet maintain that parti-
cipant observation is not that common when it comes to studies of 
social movements but can nevertheless contribute to the research of 
such movements in multiple ways. Two of the ways described by 
them are especially relevant here, which are “breaking down the il-
lusion of homogeneity” and “revealing gaps between ideology and 
practices.”28 In such a way, participant observation can at times be 
helpful in locating possible discrepancies between the informants’ 
statements and actions. Furthermore, the chosen methods seem suit-
able in order to critically examine the narrative of unity surrounding 
27 Malthaner S., “Fieldwork in the Context of Violent Conflict and Authoritarian Re-
gimes”, in della Porta D. (ed.), Methodological Practices in Social Movement Re-
search, 2014, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 173–194, p. 190.
28 Balsiger P., Lambelet A., “Participant observation”, in della Porta D. (ed.), Method-
ological Practices in Social Movement Research, 2014, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 144–172, p. 148, 150.
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the movement. A close-up picture may enhance the understanding 
of how this narrative actually translated among the protesters before 
accepting it for a fact and moving on to, for instance, discussing ex-
ternal factors as possible obstacles. 
3. Sociopolitical and historical implications  
for national unity in Lebanon
First of all, it is important to consider the sociopolitical and histor-
ical context making the question of national unity in Lebanon both 
relevant and complicated. Although the vast majority of Lebanon’s 
population is considered to be Arabs, the main criteria for ethnic dif-
ferentiation here is religion. There are 18 officially recognized reli-
gious sects in Lebanon, none of which constitute a clear majority. The 
biggest confessional groups are Muslims and Christian Maronites.29 
Exact statistical information on religious distribution is virtually im-
possible to acquire, given that the latest official census in Lebanon 
was conducted in 1932. Based on independent regional research from 
2018, the Muslim Shi’a constitute 31.6%, Muslim Sunni  31.2% and 
Christians (Maronites and smaller confessions combined)  30.6% 
of the population.30 A small but influential confessional group, the 
Druze, constitute about 5.2% of the population.31 The religious demo-
graphics are especially important due to the fact that the Lebanese 
political system is based on confessionalism, or a kind of consoci-
ationalism, where political representation is instructed by religious 
29 Nelson S., “Is Lebanon’s confessional system sustainable?“, Journal of Politics & 
International Studies 9, 2013, <https://www.academia.edu/7157145/Is_Lebanons_
confessional_system_sustainable>, 2021-01-29, p. 340.
30 Ramadan T., “New report reveals substantial demographic changes in Lebanon”, 
<https://www.annahar.com/english/article/1002964-new-report-reveals-substantial-
demographic-changes-in-lebanon>, 2021-01-30.
31 United States Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 
“Lebanon 2017. International religious freedom report”, <https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/Lebanon-2.pdf>, 2021-01-30.
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distribution within the population.32 According to the confessional 
power-sharing agreement introduced with the 1926 Constitution and 
reinstated in The National Pact of 1943 and the Ta’if Accord of 1989, 
the presidential post is reserved for a Maronite, the Prime minister 
must be a Sunni, and the speaker of parliament a Shi’a, while other 
posts are distributed among all the sects proportionally.33
In order to understand the challenges brought about by this sys-
tem, the concept of sectarianism needs to be discussed. While the 
notion of confessionalism, used to describe the power-sharing prin-
ciple, is neutral, sectarianism entails principle along with ideology 
and social structure produced by it. The term is a translation of the 
Arabic ṭa‘ifiya, which according to Mark Farha, “carries a particu-
larly negative power” in Lebanon, having originated from the context 
of confessional strife.34 Definitions of the term vary among schol-
ars. Some have attempted to limit its meaning to “a marker of social 
rank” undermining the religious connotations.35 Others have been 
comparing ṭa‘ifiya to a kind of religious caste resembling the Indian 
notion.36 De-emphasizing religious identity is, according to Farha, 
problematic, as the term was used to refer to particular sects already 
in the seventeenth century, while the comparison to the Indian casts 
entails an overly rigid socioeconomic hierarchy. Nevertheless, the 
latter does capture the term’s multiple layers of meaning, in particu-
lar, its social and sectarian dimensions.37 Salloukh explains sectarian-
ism as “politicization of religious identities,” linking it to raising the 
32 Faour M. A., “Religion, Demography, and Politics in Lebanon”, Middle Eastern 
Studies 43 (6), 2007, p. 909–921, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40262539>, 2021-01-
30, p. 909.
33 Nagle J., Clancy M. A., “Power-sharing after Civil War: Thirty Years since Lebanon’s 
Taif Agreement”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 25 (1), 2019, p. 1–8, <https://doi.or
g/10.1080/13537113.2019.1565171>, Faour, 2007, p. 909.
34 Farha M., Lebanon. The Rise and Fall of a Secular State under Siege, 2019, Cambridge: 
University Press, p. 12.
35 Makdisi, 2000, as cited in Farha, 2019, p. 12.
36 Saadeh, 1993, as cited in Farha, 2019, p. 14.
37 Farha, 2019, p. 12, 14.
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interests of one confessional community above others, confessional 
segregation, and clientelism. According to him, sectarianism is also 
affecting the ideological imagination, “producing sectarian subjects” 
unable to reach a consensus regarding the question of “what does 
Lebanon mean?”38 
Similarly, the Lebanese sects, or ṭawa’if, carry with them multiple 
layers of meaning. As Farha puts it, ṭawa’if entail “at once communal 
connotations, religious identities and politico-economic interests”. 
They can also be thought of in terms of communities constituting ‘‘‘cli-
entelistic interest groups’, Klientelgruppen, represented by political 
bosses.”39 Thus, in the sectarian system, the sects’ multiple meanings 
and functions mirror the functions of the sectarian leaders, who, among 
other things, play the role of patrons to their respective clientelistic 
groups. This system can be seen as creating divisions within the soci-
ety, overlapping with, but based on more than religious affiliation. This 
order is maintained through the institutional system. 
An important role is played by the personal status laws which are 
based on religious affiliation, meaning that all the matters concerning 
marriage, custody, inheritance and alike are to be addressed according 
to the rules set by one’s sect and not by the constitution. As Salloukh 
puts it, the Lebanese are divided and besieged “in a web of sectarian 
legal procedures from birth to death, each locked into her or his com-
munal group.”40 Farha addresses this as a certain contradiction, as al-
though the Lebanese constitution overall is considered secular, per-
sonal status laws are exempted from it; thus, Farha argues that religion 
and state are separated by giving “maximum amount of jurisdiction 
over personal status laws and education to the sects.” He maintains that 
this threatens “to spur confessional subnationalities within schools, 
mosques and churches.”41 Thus, national unity may be challenged.
38 Salloukh B. F., interview for the Lebanese Politics Podcast, September 30, 2019, 
<https://soundcloud.com/lebpoliticspodcast/episode-57-sectarianism>, 2021-01-30.
39 Farha, 2019, p. 15.
40 Salloukh et al., 2015, p. 50.
41 Farha, 2019, p. 263.
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Historically speaking, the problem of a unified national idea and 
divisions somewhat overlapping with confessional lines is not new 
in Lebanon. Carol Hakim argues that “coherent nationalist claims” 
of Lebanese nationalists were first formulated few months before the 
establishment of the state.42 According to him, Lebanism was ori-
ginally not universally opposed to, but overlapped with Ottomanism 
and Syrianism. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, these ideas 
turned into competing “claims for the independence of a Greater Le-
banon, a Greater Syria, or an Arab Empire,” which were “forcibly 
settled by France.”43 Kamal Salibi asserts that in the newly estab-
lished state, two opposed ideas, Lebanism, embracing it, and Ara-
bism, rooting for a broader unity of the Arabs, clashed and largely 
overlapped with religious differences. The former was supported 
by mainly Christian Maronites, influenced by France, and the latter 
mainly by Muslims, influenced by other Arabs.44 
Hakim traces the origin of Lebanism to the mid-nineteenth century 
and the interactions between the French and the Christian Maronites 
of Mount Lebanon in pursuit of a “a vague political project” of “estab-
lishing a Christian entity in the Levant under French aegis.”45 In the 
same vein, Ussama Makdisi traces the problem of “the sect or ṭa‘ifa” 
becoming “the quasi-nation defined against other ṭa‘ifas” in general to 
the nineteenth century, when the Lebanese elites were using religion 
as an argument in order to secure European support.46 The same tend-
ency prevailed in the twentieth century, when the current power-shar-
ing principle was introduced. There are some differences in opinions 
regarding the origins of the confessional articles in the constitution of 
42 Hakim C., The Origins of the Lebanese Idea: 1840–1920, 2013, Berkeley: University 
of California Press, p. 9.
43 Ibid., p. 261, 263, 264.
44 Salibi K. S., A House of Many Mansions, 1985, London: L.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, p. 31, 
36, 37, 39.
45 Ibid., p. 43.
46 Makdisi U., “Reconstructing the Nation-State: The Modernity of Sectarianism in 
Lebanon”, Middle East Report 200, p. 23–30, 1996, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/
i350790>, 2021-01-30, p. 24.
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1926 as to them being mainly imposed by France, as proposed by Mak-
disi or aimed, at least to some extent, “to recognize local identities,” as 
suggested by Farha.47 Regardless of this argument, there does exist a 
consensus that the confessional categories have been instrumentalized 
by both local and foreign elites in order to secure their influence, which 
lead to the divisions prevailing to this day.
The divisions were further entrenched during the Civil War of 
1975–1990 through what Fawwaz Traboulsi calls “a new configura-
tion of space.” The state was de facto ruled by the militias that divided 
the country into cantons and “cleansed their territories” creating “reli-
giously homogeneous enclaves.”48 At the same time, political oppon-
ents, as well as “foreigners” and “intruders” (mainly Palestinians), 
were expelled. As Traboulsi puts it, “a new demographic equilibrium 
by double means of death and emigration” was created.49 He calls 
this process a “memoricide,” meaning that the memories of common 
mutual ties and interests were forcibly replaced by a “discourse of 
‘protection’: the other wants to kill you, but we are here to save your 
lives.”50 Thus, the divisions hardened considerably. Additionally, 
while the civil war was still ongoing, Kamal Salibi wrote about dif-
ferent versions of history taught in Lebanese schools and observed 
that the continuing civil war in Lebanon was “a war to determine the 
correct history of the country.”51 This problem persists to this day, 
due to a lack of agreement about a common history of the civil war 
itself and a certain “state-sponsored amnesia,”52 which can be seen as 
a continuation of Traboulsi’s “memoricide.”
It may be noted that certain political parties did raise the question 
of abolishing the power-sharing system based on confessionalism in 
47 Farha, 2019, p. 144.
48 Traboulsi F., A History of Modern Lebanon, 2nd edition, London: Pluto Press, 2012, 
p. 238–240.
49 Ibid., p. 244–245.
50 Ibid., p. 239–240.
51 Salibi, 1985, p. 201–202.
52 Larkin C., “Beyond The War? The Lebanese Postmemory Experience”, International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 42 (4), p. 615–635, 2010, <http://www.jstor.org/
stable/41308712>, 2021-01-30, p. 618.
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the second part of the twentieth century. However, as Salibi argues, 
the actual goal of raising this question was decreasing the power of 
the Maronites, who benefited from the system, and the calls for sec-
ularization “were themselves highly confessional, especially when 
they were articulated by traditional leaderships which fed on confes-
sional group feelings among members of their respective sects.”53
The postwar period began with the Ta’if agreement of 1989, 
which reinstated the power-sharing system as a temporary solution 
without setting any date or procedure for the transition from it. Be-
sides, the sectarian and political elites were supposed to be the ones 
who both maintained the system and reformed it.54 This led to “ce-
menting” rather than resolving sectarian divisions. The elites have 
not been interested in strengthening the state, rather, on the contrary, 
maintaining a divided “weak state” has been beneficial for them.55
Besides internal divisions among the local elites, the postwar 
period was characterized by the Syrian presence (1990–2005) al-
lowed by the Ta’if accord.56 All the areas of sociopolitical life be-
came subject to Syrian influence; thus, any integration or effective 
power-sharing was hardly possible.57 The Syrian departure in 2005 
left a power vacuum, while the main political players engaged in 
a battle for influential positions. The politicians divided themselves 
into two camps, anti-Syrian and pro-Syrian: the Sunni-dominated 14 
March alliance and the Shi’a-dominated 8 March opposition, respect-
ively.58 As Barakat, al-Habbal and Salloukh explain it, Lebanon went 
from Maronite-dominated to Muslim-dominated under the Syrian 
influence and to “a fierce Sunni-Shi’a power struggle over control of 
the post-Syrian Lebanese state.”59 
53 Salibi, 1985, p. 194.
54 Salloukh et al., 2015, p. 21.
55 Nagle, Clancy, 2019, p. 5.
56 Ibid., p. 3.
57 Salloukh et al., 2015, p. 25, 27.
58 Ibid., p. 29.
59 Ibid., p. 28.
ISSN 1392-1681   eISSN 2424-6034   Politologija 2020/4 (100)
86
As we can see, the reconciliation among the Lebanese seems to 
never have been reached and no real efforts towards it were made 
by the political elite. It is against this background that the longing 
for building a national unity from below is being brought up in the 
context of social movements. 
4. Findings
4.1. Perceived divisions and unity
First of all, it is worth to discuss if the assumed divisions along con-
fessional lines are actually perceived as such by the informants. It has 
become clear that such divisions are indeed relevant, but the extent 
to which they affect the informants varies. Those who present them-
selves as atheists or simply not religious tend to see others as divided, 
but not themselves. Likewise, the informants whose parents come 
from different religious backgrounds tend to see others as divided by 
religion and themselves as open. It is also evident that religion inter-
sects with politics, and having certain political views at times blends 
with religious categories. For instance, a 24-year-old man, whose 
father is Shi’a and mother Sunni, explains:
For me the religious identity is not important since childhood, my pa-
rents are in sports, they don’t care about these things. But even now some 
friends follow politicians. It’s put in your head from childhood. (Ali, 24) 
Thus, “following politicians’’ is related to one’s religious identity.
Some other informants talk about more intensive experiences of 
divisions, as shared by an 18-year-old female student (Sunni): 
Yeah, yeah, it’s everywhere. It’s in the way we talk, names we give each 
other, how we choose our sexual partners. Like, my parents won’t let 
me marry a Christian or a girl. The regions are different. For example, 
the villages are more Christian, the cities more Islamic. You realize it in 
everything, restaurants, everything. (Dina, 18)
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In the example above, marrying a person of a different religion 
would be as difficult for the informant’s parents to accept as their 
daughter’s sexual orientation. Perhaps belonging to the LGBTQ 
community in itself has strengthened the feelings of alienation, 
which is mirrored by the answers of another unrelated informant. 
This example also touches upon another recurring aspect, namely 
geographical divisions. As different cities or parts of them are often 
dominated by one religious community, to some extent, as a result 
of the aforementioned cleansing during the civil war, the divisions 
are often related to geographical categories. By asking where one is 
from, for instance, the people can place each other in different com-
munities and adjust the relations between themselves accordingly. 
Sometimes the divisions are particularly visible  when shown around 
in the southern part of Beirut, I was pointed to two areas, one just 
on the other side of the road from the other  one of them Christian 
and wealthy, the other Shi’a and poor. “Capitalist and proletariat,” as 
jokingly commented on by my guide, a Sunni student, who also ex-
plained that people of other religions are not allowed to buy property 
in the respective areas. This is an example of how religious segrega-
tion intersects with economic and geographic divisive lines. 
Another aspect impacting the divisions is belonging to different 
generations. The majority of informants (as of the participants of the 
movement overall) are quite young and seem to feel that there is less 
division among younger people, while the older generation is more 
divided. However, the oldest informant, a 66-year-old female univer-
sity professor (Sunni), opposes this statement:
You know, I never felt it in my life. I never felt it in my life, I had a circle 
of friends, who were like me, who were really secular. And they always 
thought that you can be religious, you can work on your religion, on the 
spiritual part of your religion, but stay secular concerning the life of 
everybody. (Zaina, 66)
This informant’s view can perhaps be related to her high level of 
education. Although it does demonstrate that there are other factors 
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besides age that can determine one’s position, generational differences 
seem to indeed play a role, sometimes explained by opposing those 
who remember the civil war and are afraid and those who are not.
The perceived divisions can also depend on the type of com-
munity. For instance, all 4 unrelated informants with a Druze back-
ground talk about strong feelings of divisions, as illustrated by the 
words of a 23-year-old male student. When asked if he had experi-
enced any divisions, he explains:
Very very very very very much so. […] I was born in a Druze family, […] 
And they are very conservative and […] very protective of their sectarian 
identity, so it was always an issue, trying to break free of that. Because I 
even felt it on a very very personal level, being a queer individual living 
in Lebanon, I feel like sectarianism is a complete opposite direction of 
what is safe and what is valid […] for people in my community. […] the-
re was always this kind of emphasis on who we are, who we […] pledge 
allegiance to. And it’s not only that, it’s also that there is a sense of tea-
ching […], that because you are a Druze, then you are going to face a lot 
of struggles growing up and that this community does not like the Druze, 
this community does not like the Druze, so it’s kind of a narrative that is 
perpetuated across generations. (Abbas, 23)
The particularly strong feelings may have to do with Druze being 
a very closed community, as no one can become Druze, and marrying 
outside the religion means being expelled as a Druze. All these condi-
tions can create an especially protective environment. 
In the same way the assumed divisions were confirmed by the 
informants, the narrative of unity also was clearly reflected in the 
informants’ statements. Virtually all of them expressed certain hap-
piness that people gathered together despite religious and political 
differences. At the same time, the confidence in unity varied among 
the informants. Some being very optimistic, others remained suspi-
cious towards the durability of this new unity, seeing obstacles in the 
memories of the civil war, the closed-mindedness of “others” who 
still follow the leaders, or doubts about reaching the practical goals. 
There were also different personal positions: some claimed to have 
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been ready for a change for a while and have waited for “others” to 
“wake up,” while others admitted undergoing personal changes. 
Just like divisions seemed to intersect with geographical categor-
ies, one of the aspects of unity was related to uniting across different 
geographical regions. The movement seemed to show that certain ste-
reotypes about various regions were faulty. It was illustrated by, for 
instance, protesters in the Shi’a-dominated southern area of Nabatieh, 
who targeted the offices of political leaders despite the assumption of 
them being particularly keen followers.60 Sunni-dominated Tripoli 
has been called “the bride of the revolution” and through their color-
ful demonstrations gained a lot of positive attention, rebranding from 
a conservative or even dangerous city to an inspiring example. 
A certain role here might have been played by the fact that differ-
ent places, just as people, gained visibility which they had not nor-
mally had. As commented by one of the university professors, the 
movement has “discovered” the poor. As the demonstrations were 
broadcasted on TV and the internet, interviews were taken from 
many protesters; thus, a chance to hear each other’s stories appeared.
New ties across communities can also be related to the move-
ment opening up new spaces for people with different backgrounds 
to meet. In addition to the protests, various discussions, lectures, film 
screenings and concerts were arranged on the squares of the demon-
strations. The perceived lack of public spaces for people to meet and 
the idea of “taking back” such spaces was explicitly expressed on 
the streets. The possibility to meet and connect on other aspects than 
religion seemed important for many. As a-30-year-old unemployed 
Christian explains:
 I’m Christian Catholic, he’s a Muslim, converted Christianity, I have in 
my tent Muslim Sunni, Muslim Shi’a, I have Derzi [plural of Druze]. And 
we never ever talk about the religion, ever, you know? The only thing we 
talk about is that, what’s our next move? (Michael, 30)
60 Houssari N., “Nabatieh rises against Hezbollah and Amal”, <https://www.arabnews.
com/node/1574416/middle-east>, 2021-01-30.
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It has become clear that the divisions along confessional lines are 
definitely palpable among the informants and tend to intersect with 
geographical categories, generational differences and political pos-
itions. The intensity of experiences may also be affected by educa-
tion, sexual orientation and other social circumstances. These factors 
might be seen as having created conditions for competing everyday 
nationalisms, where the sentiment is directed towards one’s sect as 
a subnationality. This is then not a purely bottom-up process as de-
scribed by Kaufman, as the everyday practices are heavily impacted 
by the sectarian structure. Thus, it is in a way the ruling elite that sets 
the boundaries for this everyday ideology, which is simultaneously 
reinforced by “following the politicians” representing that ideology. 
For most of the informants this is, however, no longer a part of “un-
conscious behavior.” This could mean that through everyday prac-
tices and interactions not fitting with the old ideology, a new form of 
unity from below has emerged and reached a tipping point coinciding 
with the movement of October 17th. The movement provided new 
spaces for people with different backgrounds to connect on a new 
basis or engage in “viral peer-to-peer networking,” creating a “feed-
back loop” reinforcing the new unity.
4.2. Building a civil state 
The main dividing force identified by the informants was the politi-
cization of religion, or sectarianism, which should be resolved 
through secularism or building a civil state.61 It was either clearly 
expressed through talking about the civil state [dawla madanīya] as 
a goal or by saying that politics and religions should not be mixed. 
The divisions were attributed to “them” [politicians] using religion to 
divide “us,” while “we are one people,” as illustrated by a statement 
of a 30-year-old Sunni woman:
61 Secularism is understood here as an opposition to the politicization of religion, not 
to religiosity itself. The term is used as defined by Farha: “the elimination of any 
confessional consideration from all the aspects of the administrative and juridical 
levels of the (Lebanese) body politic” (2019, p. 28).
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Because these politicians were fueling their sectarianism and they’ve 
been sort of trying to use sect as a weakness, tried to intimidate them, 
that you’re threatened, your presence is threatened because the other… 
While Lebanese people are, you know, they are brothers and sisters. 
(Lena, 30)
Keeping religion and politics separate was seen as a solution not 
only for divisions, but for practical problems as well. Some took 
up, for instance, issues related to interconfessional marriage, which 
is currently not possible in Lebanon; thus, couples from different 
confessions travel abroad to get married. Other examples revolved 
around inheritance and child custody. These issues intersect with wo-
men’s rights, which were broadly voiced within the movement, as be-
cause of the current personal status laws, women may face problems 
with, for instance, unequal inheritance or losing custody in case of 
divorce. Although the willingness to change the system stems most 
clearly from the general discontent and belief in the current state be-
ing deeply corrupt, thus changing the whole principle seems to kindle 
hope even with those who do not seem concerned with secularism as 
such. Regardless of the different motivations, it seems evident that 
the idea of building a civil state together played the role of a uniting 
power.
Ideals of civic nationalism were also often explicit in the inform-
ants’ statements. When asked what unity among the Lebanese could 
be based on, a 34-year-old male Shi’a answered:
It must be based on the citizenship, respect for the country. When you 
respect your country, you respect everyone. If you respect your leader, 
there is division. (Fadi, 34)
Similarly, many have expressed the vision of a country based on 
equality and satisfying the citizens’ rights and needs, which would 
raise allegiance to the country above allegiance to one’s leader, reli-
gion or region. 
Despite the feeling of unity around the vision for future Lebanon, 
in terms of dividing religion and politics, this question is not an easy 
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one. The obstacles were seen as those outside the movement, “they 
who still follow leaders” and leaders who manipulate religions. Very 
few saw religion itself as a divisive force; however, a 35-year-old 
Christian actress acknowledges that certain civil values may contra-
dict the values of religious people who live “by the book” and gives 
her own example:
My parents are like, they are not extremist, but they are religious and 
they are… My parents are old, they were raised to be like Christians […] 
their children would marry only Christians, you know what I mean? They 
don’t hate Muslims, but they’re just like “don’t go get married. Like, we’re 
Christians and we stay within the Christian thing.” (Maya, 35)
Thus, there is a possibility that the influence of religion as such 
or the religious and not only political leaders is somewhat underes-
timated by some. 
If we focus on building a civil state as a uniting power, there are 
still some issues to be resolved. One such issue is determining who 
would be included in the new “us.” For one thing, this is related to the 
issue of women not being able to transfer citizenship to their children. 
This question was raised within the movement by women’s rights 
activists and organizations, such as “My nationality my dignity” 
[Jinsiyati Karamati], working to help families struggling to acquire 
the Lebanese nationality. While many support this struggle, others 
are actually opposed to it. A female Sunni student from Tripoli, for 
instance, believes that as the Lebanese do not get the same rights in 
the neighboring Arab countries, the same should apply here (many of 
those facing the issue actually being Syrian or Palestinian refugees 
or migrants). Another informant, a female master’s student born in 
a Palestinian refugee camp in Beirut, shared that she has for a long 
time felt repulsed by anything Lebanese until this movement. It was 
due to the struggles and the exclusion she had to face because of 
her status, which improved only when she married a Lebanese man. 
While the movement did give her hope and even inspired somewhat 
patriotic feelings towards Lebanon, the outcome concerning the ex-
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clusion of people with refugee status may affect her feeling as a part 
of the new “us.”62 The attitude towards refugees as such may be a 
somewhat divisive question  while a part of the protestors feel that 
refugee rights is one of their goals of the movement, others are very 
cautious about Lebanese exclusively benefiting from it, as put by an 
unemployed 30-year-old Christian:
[…] we have to like don’t look on the outside foreigners, such as other 
countries, they look first of all for their hometown people. No more “you 
go get the foreigners to start working.” But here, everywhere you go, 
you find other nationalities. I’m not talking about Europeans, no, I’m 
talking about Syrians. Syrians, Syrians, Syrians, Syrians, wherever you 
go. Wherever you go, you know? What about us? (Michael, 30)
Nevertheless, the idea of building a civil state was overwhelm-
ingly present and could be seen as an expression of civic nationalism 
working as a unifying power, whereby the top-down reinforcement of 
the communal identities would be eliminated, while the communit-
ies could maintain their differences and unite around “the idiom of 
nationhood,” as suggested by Kaufman. The issue is complicated 
by some differences in the vision of the nation, that impact people’s 
rights or even inclusion in this nation. This diversity in personal na-
tionalisms can hardly be accommodated without impacting the extent 
of the national unity.
4.3. Under the Lebanese flag and national pride 
A recurring motive within the movement was that of finding a new 
pride in being Lebanese and raising it above all other categories. In 
this case the feelings can be based on both cultural categories and 
ethnic nationalism, or solidarity with fellow citizens, and civic na-
tionalism at the same time.
62 Estimated number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is 1.5 million, which constitutes 20% 
of the population. There are also at least 270 000 Palestinian refugees (numbers vary 
depending on the source). Data from: European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid 
Operations, <https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/middle-east/lebanon_en>, 2021-01-30.
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One aspect that could be related to both forms of nationalism is 
language. Civic nationalism is concerned with language at least as 
a part of social infrastructure.63 On the other hand, language maybe 
seen as a cultural trait not necessarily shared by all the citizens.64 
Here, language has been important both in terms of infrastructure 
and its cultural value. The majority of universities in Lebanon teach 
in English, with rarer instances of French as the language of instruc-
tion. Within the movement, various discussions and lectures were 
arranged in Arabic, which was emphasized as important both for 
making them accessible to everybody and for raising the status of the 
local language.
When asked about the meaning of being Lebanese, some inform-
ants mentioned historical roots, relation to Phoenicians, food or cul-
tural diversity. In answering such questions, people were searching 
for cultural traits shared by all and not divisive. Perhaps, while redis-
covering pride in being Lebanese, a process of attributing this feel-
ing with certain cultural values took place. Then the values which 
support the civic “us” were emphasized, and not those which would 
divide the common “us” into smaller groups. The most frequent an-
swer defining being Lebanese was related to being happy or “know-
ing how to live.” This trait was reflected by the mode of the protest 
itself. The demonstrations included a lot of singing, dancing and had 
an overall cheerful character, at least in the first weeks of the move-
ment. Some criticized this as ineffective, but accepted the songs as 
long as they were patriotic  thus, the importance of raising national 
feelings was consciously acknowledged. At the same time, while cri-
tiquing the excessive celebratory mood, the “Lebaneseness” of it was 
often accepted. As put by a 26-year-old Christian woman: “And I was 
saying this is not a way of protesting. Maybe it is a Lebanese way, 
if you want, but there are limits.” Thus, while perceived by some as 
63 Smith A. D., Nationalism and Modernism. A critical survey of recent theories of 
nations and nationalism, 1998, London: Routledge, p. 20.
64 Stilz A., “Civic Nationalism and Language Policy”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2009, 
37 (3), p. 257–292, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40468467>, 2021-04-08, p. 257.
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impractical, the dancing and singing might have played a role in “de-
fining who we are through how we do things.”65
The celebratory mode of the demonstrations may be seen as a 
part of searching for common cultural traits to emphasize and build 
national feelings on. At the same time, as mentioned by some in-
formants, the cultural variation could itself be a distinguishing trait 
for the Lebanese. From Kaufman’s point of view, all of this might be 
strengthening the national sentiment through relation to “the idiom 
of nationhood.”
The movement could also be characterized by an extensive pres-
ence of various national symbols. The meaning of the flag was ac-
knowledged both physically and symbolically, emphasizing unity 
under the Lebanese flag, or people of many religions all carrying 
one flag. Music and particularly patriotic songs, constantly played at 
the squares of the demonstrations, could have both helped to fuel the 
national feelings, and played a role in charging the national symbols 
with positive connotations, as suggested by Kolstø. It is though fair 
to mention that the affection for the flag was not entirely universal. A 
23-year-old Druze student explains:
I’m someone […] who’s not very friends with the idea of nationalism or 
like patriotism. […] during all the revolution, the entire time, I would 
always refuse to carry like a Lebanese flag or to put any sort of national 
sentiments onto myself, because I don’t think that that’s the essence of 
it. And I do believe that it could actually lead to more harm than good, 
because once identities are accentuated to a certain extent and so politi-
cally infused, especially in times of turmoil, we can easily go back to the 
“us versus them” kind of mentality. (Abbas, 23)
A critical approach to nationalism has to do with caution towards 
new divisions and can be related to the informant being a master’s 
65 Based on Francesca Poletta’s and James J. Jasper’s suggestion that the choice of strat-
egy is related to identity and can be a tool in itself: Jasper Poletta F., Jasper J. M., “Col-
lective Identity and Social Movements”, Annual Review of Sociology 27 (1), 2001, 
p. 283–305, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.27.1.283>, p. 292.
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student of political science, well aware of the pitfalls of nationalism, 
which can reflect the feelings of others in his circle. Nevertheless, the 
overwhelming number of national symbols displayed in the demon-
strations shows that they did play an important role in uniting the pro-
testers, and probably raising the prestige of the symbols themselves. 
4.4. “They don’t give us anything”:  
the elite and the question of effectiveness
The main basis for people to unite upon and reject the old system or 
perhaps reach the tipping point seems to be related to their material 
needs. It can be illustrated by an answer of a 24-year-old man from 
a Shi’a-Sunni family to a question on what could unite the people in 
the long run: “There is already unity. Politicians don’t give us any-
thing.” This simply sums up the unity emerging from discontent with 
the current situation. A recurring narrative on the streets had to do 
with the suffering that was equal among the Lebanese of different 
religions, and the realization that, as explained by one of the inform-
ants, a Christian in Lebanon does not have the same problems as a 
Christian in Syria, but the same as his fellow Lebanese Muslim. 
It has become clear for many that the old system cannot satisfy 
their needs, which contributed to the willingness to reject the whole 
ideology behind that system. The crisis brought with it multiple situ-
ations that created incentives for people to unite. As illustrated by an 
example from an unemployed 30-year-old Christian:
When the petrol got blocked, no more petrol. [Referring to a strike of 
petrol stations.66] All of the cars, from all of the religions, everyone here 
stopped their cars in the middle of the street. Is it Sunni, Christian, Dru-
ze, Shi’a? All stopped in the middle of the street. (Michael, 30)
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While the unity based on the discontent seems to be evident, its 
durability might be dependent on the success of the movement. The 
informants are conscious about that, saying “For unity to stay we 
need results.” Thus, the new national feelings might also at least par-
tially depend on the practical outcome, as addressed by a psychiat-
rist from Syria providing acute psychological help at the site of the 
demonstrations:
I do believe this square is a new identity formation. And I don’t think it’s 
random, because you come here and you think it’s not a political pro-
test. This is a carnival. And I think this is for a reason, because, there is 
nothing else that would unite these people, other than just dancing and 
singing. Which is fine for now […] but then you hope [it would] deve-
lop a political agenda, form into a political party and field candidates, 
because I don’t know how this going to make any difference, unless it 
matures into a movement. (Farid, 40s)
This comment raises an important question not addressed by 
Kaufman, that is the issue of effectiveness of an ideology. If the elite-
driven nationalism does depend on it, perhaps so does the bottom-up 
national sentiment, which poses the question of leadership.
The movement of October 17th has without failure been presen-
ted as leaderless. The response to the continuous pressure from the 
government to appoint leaders for discussions was that the demands 
were clear and that no negotiations were needed. In addition, the slo-
gan “I am the leader of the revolution” was spread on social media 
and through artistic means on the squares: the multiple drawings and 
mirrors with the phrase were put on the walls for people to take pic-
tures of and share their selfies. This created a certain sense of unity 
and pride in itself, as did different collective actions, such as clean-
ing the squares and sorting the garbage, arranging the celebration of 
the National Day, and other activities through which a message that 
the Lebanese people can take care of their country better than their 
leaders was spread. In the ideological sense, having no leaders might 
indeed have facilitated a “viral” spread. 
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In practical terms, some felt leaders were necessary for reaching 
the goals of the movement. Others praised the absence of leaders 
within the movement, seeing it as a “new way,” or expressing fear 
that if appointed, they would be eliminated by the government. This 
view was also expressed by an informant from Lihaqqi.67 This is 
somewhat contradictory, as the informant himself is working to be-
come a part of future leadership. In terms of obstacles, the informant 
mainly saw the old political leaders who had not yet “used their ag-
gressiveness.” From conversations with other informants, however, it 
seemed that the trust in the political civil society groups themselves 
is not always that strong. The break with the old system and the de-
cisive rejection of its leaders might at the same time have made it 
difficult for any new leaders to emerge. Even those expressing a des-
perate need of a leader at times disregarded already existing groups. 
Some expressed suspicion towards any organizations participating 
in the movement, as they might be chasing political goals, which 
is perceived as negative due to a deep mistrust in politicians over-
all. It points to a vicious circle of a kind, where being a part of the 
system means being corrupt, and having succeeded in establishing a 
somewhat successful group means being a part of the system. This 
does not mean that all the participants of the movement rejected all 
the groups. The presence of civil society organizations has still been 
creating an opportunity to expand their ties and influence through 
arranging discussions and lectures as well as participating in various 
actions, thus working through peer-to-peer networks, but their pres-
ence has not been unchallenged.
Meanwhile, the rejection of the “old leaders” and embracing 
the principle of “Everyone means everyone” seemed universal. On 
the surface, it could have been summed up by opposition of “us,” 
who have left divisions behind and are building a new Lebanon, and 
“them,” who still follow their leaders. When examined more closely, 
67 Lihaqqi (For my rights)  one of the civil society political groups active in the 
movement, alongside Mouwatinoun wa Mouwatinat fi Dawla (Citizens in a State), 
Beirut Medinati (Beirut my city) and Sabaa (Seven) movement. 
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the relationship with the old leaders seemed to be more complex. For 
some, rejecting all the leaders was unquestionable, while for others 
it posed a challenge, as illustrated by one of the Druze informants:
We need to agree about “Everyone means everyone.” I sacrificed my 
culture. I love Walid Jumblatt.68 He opens his house to people every 
week, but I’m not one hundred percent sure he is not corrupt, so we 
need to sacrifice. We need a judge, we cannot always trust our feelings. 
If I sacrifice and Hizbullah people sacrifice, we can be as one Lebanese 
people. (Amin, 20s) 
A 34-year-old male Shi’a has on the contrary said that he is 
against the “Everyone means everyone,” as it would lead to chaos, 
while some others expressed more complex views on the leader of 
Hizbullah in particular. More fluctuations could probably be revealed 
at a more thorough examination of the question of leadership. At the 
same time, it seemed clear that the unity is heavily reliant on shared 
grievances and rejecting the old leaders along with the ineffective 
ideology associated with them. It can then seem that a bottom-up 
version of civic nationalism is opposed to “ethnic” (in terms of loy-
alties) top-down nationalism. This would, however, entail an over-
simplification. The old ideology is hardly exclusively top-down, as 
it can be seen as reinforced through everyday nationalism, even if it 
is shaped by the elite-sponsored structure. At the same time, while 
the bottom-up character of the new ideology seems to facilitate its 
“viral” spread, its durability might be dependent on resolving the 
grievances that triggered the rejection of the old ideology and thus 
leadership. The failure to resolve these issues might reinstate the 
importance of clientelistic ties shaping people’s networking. On the 
other hand, as the space for the new national unity seems to have 
appeared despite the seemingly rigid social structure, there is basis 
68 The most prominent Druze leader, the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, for more 
details, see, for instance: Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa, 
<https://www.encyclopedia.com/international/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-
maps/jumblatt-walid-1949>, 2021-01-31. 
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to believe that it may persevere after a period of intensive “peer-to-
peer networking.” Nevertheless, the question of how meaningful a 
national sentiment can be if people’s basic needs are not satisfied 
remains open. 
Conclusion
This article, based on an ethnographic study conducted in Beirut 
between October 17 and December 19, 2019, analyzes the Lebanese 
movement of October 17th as an instance of nation-building from be-
low, seeking to understand how the emerging national unity was being 
constructed, what it was based on and what are the implications for its 
durability, while paying attention to the role of the elite in this process. 
First of all, the assumption that certain divisions along sectarian 
lines are present in the Lebanese society were checked against the 
gathered data. The divisions have proven to be palpable and often re-
lated to geographical categories, generational differences, economic 
circumstances and political positions. These factors might be seen as 
have created conditions for competing everyday nationalisms which 
are at the same time reinforced by elite. However, a unity across 
the different communities seems to have emerged from below and 
reached a tipping point coinciding with the movement of October 
17th. The movement provided new spaces for people with different 
backgrounds to engage in “viral peer-to-peer networking” creating a 
“feedback loop” reinforcing the new unity.
The newly found unity can be seen as largely related to shared 
grievances, which pushed the different communities to cooperate and 
reject the old system and its elite. The new system is envisioned in 
terms of a civil state, where politics are separated from religion and 
the citizens are loyal to the state. The unity was being reinforced by a 
vast presence of national symbols and emphasis on being Lebanese.
The “viral” spread of national ideas seemed to be effectively taking 
place, which is likely to have facilitated creating new ties for contin-
ued “peer-to-peer networking.” There are, however, some unresolved 
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challenges posed for the new unity. While the agreement on the need 
for the civil state seemed universal among the informants, the contents 
of the state were not. The discrepancies revolved around refugee and 
women’s rights, most importantly in terms of the right to pass national-
ity. Such disagreements cannot be reconciled by “the idiom of nation-
hood” as they concern the very inclusion in the nation itself. 
Perhaps most importantly, the question of effectiveness of the 
ideology remains open and is related to the question of the elite. It 
seems to be clear that elite or leaders are not necessary for a national 
sentiment to emerge, but it is still arguable in terms of its durability. 
The rejection of the old leaders and the leaderless character of the 
movement seem to have largely been unifying ideologically. At the 
same time, the lack of leadership may impair finding practical solu-
tions for the grievances that pushed people to their tipping point in 
the first place. It is still not clear if actors associated with the move-
ment will be able to occupy important leadership positions, which 
could likely strengthen the new ideology. If the old elite endures, the 
question might be perhaps how durable a bottom-up ideology can be 
if restrained and opposed by material circumstances. 
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Appendix: informants
• A few times religion was not specified and marked “n/a.” It is otherwise 
noted as expressed by the informant, that is, if the answer was “Christian,” 
without specifying denomination, it was recorded accordingly. When 
available, an answer given instead of religion is quoted.
• When only an interval and not specific age was provided it is recorded 
accordingly.
• When specific information on occupation was provided, it is recorded; 
otherwise, the relevant column is marked with “x”.
• If other available information is assumed to be relevant here, it is provided 
in the column “Other”.
No Gender Religion Age Working Student Other
1 male Shi’a-Sunni  24 x  Works in Kongo
2 male n/a  40+ Psychiatrist  From Syria
3 male Druze  23  x  
4 male Druze  20+ At a bank   





6 male Shi’a  20+ At a bank   




8 male Shi’a 34 Teacher   
9 female n/a 30 x   
10 male “I don’t believe in 
religion”
35 x  Lived abroad
10 male Shi’a 34 Unemployed  Lives at the 
protest camp, 
born in UAE
11 female Mixed family  x   
12 female Sunni 30 Unemployed, 
architect
  
13 female “I don’t belong to 
any religion.”
 27 Flight attendant  Partially Ukrai-
nian 
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No Gender Religion Age Working Student Other
14 male “I have never 
said I’m from this 
community or I’m 
Muslim or I’m 
Christian.”
 20+ x x (second 
degree)
 
15 female Sunni  20+  x (Mas-
ter’s)
Grew up in Pal-
estinian refugee 
camp.
16 male Shi’a-Christian  20+  x  
17 male Druze  20+ x x  
18 female Sunni 18  x LGBTQ
19 male Atheist  30+ Social entrepre-
neur
  Works in 
France
20 female n/a  40+ x  Lives abroad
21 female Christian  26 x   
22 female n/a  20+ Start-upper   
23 male “I’m Lebanese 
only”
 30+ x   





25 male Sunni/Atheist 23   x  
26 male n/a 25 DJ  Syrian father




28 male Christian  30 Unemployed 
(worked as a 
security guard)




29 female Sunni  20+  x  From Tripoli
30 female Christian  35 Actress   
31 male Sunni  33 x, Former politi-
cian
 Studied in 
France
32 female Sunni  66 University pro-
fessor
  
33 male Druze  23  x (Mas-
ter’s)
LGBTQ
